Population Game Model for Epidemic Dynamics with Two Classes of Vaccine-induced Immunity

Authors

  • P. Phang Department of Mathematics and Statistics, Curtin University, Perth, Australia. Department of Computational Science and Mathematics, Faculty of Computer Science and Information Technology, Universiti Malaysia Sarawak, 94300 Kota Samarahan, Sarawak, Malaysia.
  • B. Wiwatanapataphee Department of Mathematics and Statistics, Curtin University, Perth, Australia.
  • Y-H. Wu Department of Mathematics and Statistics, Curtin University, Perth, Australia.

Keywords:

Two Classes of Vaccine-Induced Immunity, Vaccination Population Games, Vaccine Efficacy,

Abstract

Behavioural factors play a key and pivotal role in the success of a voluntary vaccination programme for combating infectious diseases. Individuals usually base their voluntary vaccination decisions on the perceived costs of vaccination and infection. The perceived cost of vaccination is easily influenced by the degree of protection conferred by vaccines against infection, also known as vaccine efficacy. Although certain vaccines have a decrease in its effectiveness in specific duration of time, they do offer a reduction of transmissibility and faster recovery for vaccinated infected individuals. These additional characteristics of imperfect vaccines are well-captured in an epidemic model with two classes of vaccine-induced immunity. In this paper, the interplays between these characteristics of vaccines, the dynamics of vaccination uptake and epidemics are investigated in the vaccination population games framework. Specifically, we study to what extent the population- and individual-level vaccination rates are influenced by these characteristics of vaccines at equilibrium state.

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Published

2017-09-15

How to Cite

Phang, P., Wiwatanapataphee, B., & Wu, Y.-H. (2017). Population Game Model for Epidemic Dynamics with Two Classes of Vaccine-induced Immunity. Journal of Telecommunication, Electronic and Computer Engineering (JTEC), 9(2-9), 31–36. Retrieved from https://jtec.utem.edu.my/jtec/article/view/2673

Issue

Vol. 9 No. 2-9: Technology Transforming Lives I

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Articles

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